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EXPOSING THE CONTRADICTION:  AN
ORIGINALIST’S APPROACH TO
UNDERSTANDING WHY SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
MISINTERPRETATION
Jason A. Crook*
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
Few phrases in American jurisprudence have created more of a stir or
inspired greater controversy than the seventeen words that comprise the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Drafted by the Reconstruction
Congress in the aftermath of the Civil War, these words have been used to
strike down maximum-hours legislation,2 permit the instruction of foreign lan-
guages in schools,3 and even establish the right of minors to purchase contra-
ceptives.4  In light of its linguistic incongruity and the versatility of its judicial
precedents, one could fairly state that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process clause has been the subject of passionate debate and vary-
ing interpretation ever since its ratification in 1868.5
Recognizing the level of confusion that the due process clause produces, it
may well be asked whether substantive due process is a contradiction of terms.6
The text of various documents spanning the history of Western Civilization and
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905).
3 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397, 399-402 (1923).
4 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684, 694 (1977).
5 CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 114
(1912).  “[A]fter five hundred and sixty-seven cases involving an interpretation of the ‘due
process of law’ clause under the Amendment had been considered . . . Mr. Justice Holmes
[could only say] ‘What is due process of law depends on the circumstances.’” Id.
6
“[T]he whole idea that the Due Process Clauses have anything to do with the substance of
legislation, as opposed to the procedures that are used by the government, is subject to the
standard objection that because ‘process’ means procedure, substantive due process is not
1
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more than two-hundred state cases from the years immediately surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification suggests the following conclusion:  sub-
stantive due process is a contradiction of terms or, at a minimum, an interpreta-
tion of the due process clause that goes well beyond what it was originally
intended to mean.  In support of this conclusion, this Article considers the lan-
guage of the due process clause as it has existed at various points throughout
history, as well as analyzing the meaning that judges, legislatures, scholars, and
kings have given these words.
Admittedly, analyzing the due process clause is difficult even under the
best of conditions; in this instance, it becomes all the more challenging given
the trouble many courts have in articulating how substantive due process even
works.  As the Fifth Circuit aptly observed in Schaper v. City of Huntsville,7
substantive due process is “an area of the law famous for its controversy, and
not known for its simplicity.”8  Are the courts to define substantive due process
as “a constitutional cause of action that leaves the door ‘slightly a jar [sic] for
federal relief in truly horrendous situations’”9 or as “a modest limitation that
prohibits government action only when it is random and irrational”?10  Is the
principle best seen as the “outer limit on the legitimacy of governmental
action”11 or as “an oxymoron if there ever was one”?12
It would be far too convenient to end such an analysis with the Eleventh
Circuit’s conclusion that “substantive due process is a puzzling concept.”13
While such an observation is undoubtedly true, the controversy that the topic
raises and the level of confusion it produces in the courts correctly demand a
closer look at one of the Constitution’s most intriguing clauses.  What did the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment really mean by a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without “due process of law”?  How did an amendment
designed to protect the rights of freed slaves acquire the power to invalidate
state education statutes and abortion regulations?  Before determining whether
substantive due process is a contradiction of terms, it is first necessary to con-
sider the concept’s origin.
SENATUS POPULUSQUE ROMANUS
While a comprehensive analysis of the due process clause could begin at
any number of points throughout history, it would be fundamentally unwise to
bypass its formative period and rush into the linguistic debate about what the
“substantive” part really means.  After all, why did the principle of due process
just an error but a contradiction in terms.”  John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997).
7 Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987).
8 Id. at 716.
9 Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Nestor Colon Medina &
Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992)).
10 Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1000 (7th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1983 (2009).
11 Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999).
12 United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Arnold, J.,
concurring).
13 McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1567 (11th Cir. 1994) (Edmondson, J., concurring).
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emerge when it did and what caused it to emerge in the first place?  What type
of society would need such a clause and how would this juridical measure
protect it?  Simply put, to fully understand the contradictory nature of substan-
tive due process, it is best to begin such an analysis at the beginning and con-
sider the events that led to the concept’s formation and the unique conditions
that shaped its early evolution.
In many ways, the story of due process begins with the overthrow of the
Roman monarchy and the establishment of the Roman republic.  Four-hundred
and fifty years before the birth of Christ, an administrative commission known
as the Decemvirate undertook a massive project to consolidate Roman law into
a single unified code.14  After much work and diligent study, the result was a
promulgation known as the Twelve Tables—a simplified collection of law
meant to apprise the Roman citizenry of their basic civil rights.15  While the
majority of this legal publication has been lost to history, a surviving fragment
from Tabula Nona (Table Nine) is notable for its stance on public law: De
capite civis, nisi per maximum comitium ne ferunto.  Or, as translated into
English by T. Lambert Mears, “Only the great comitium (‘comitia centuriata’)
has the right of legislating so as to inflict a punishment on a citizen involving
his life, his liberty, or his civic rights.”16
Although juridical commentary from this era is scarce, J.B. Moyle sug-
gests that including such a provision in the heart of the Republic’s governing
structure indicates that the provision primarily operated to encourage a system
of checks and balances between “the principles of democracy and oligarchy”17
that competed for authority during the Monarchial and early Republican
periods:
The nomination of the king, or supreme executive magistrate, lay with the senate, but
required confirmation by the comitia, which, by a lex curiata, invested him with an
imperium of life-long duration, whereby he became, externally, the leader of the host
in arms, internally, the depositary of the highest administrative functions of govern-
ment.  On the other hand, it was to the populus alone, assembled in its comitia, that
the legislative function belonged.18
With such broad authority placed in the hands of one man, granting the
comitia centuriata the exclusive power to inflict punishments involving a depri-
vation of life, liberty, or civic rights ensured that multiple individuals would
have oversight of such a significant matter and minimized capricious prosecu-
tions by the royal authority.19  However, this safeguard operated in a purely
procedural context, as the law did not concern itself with the substance of the
14 1 J.B. MOYLE, IMPERATORIS IUSTINIANI INSTITUTIONUM LIBRI QUATTUOR 13 (1883).
15 Id. at 13-14.  In this regard, the Twelve Tables also provided an early framework for what
would now be known as rules of civil procedure:  “[T]he law of procedure, as to which we
have important fragments, was settled upon a basis which gave justice a fair chance of being
administered by saving from magisterial caprice the decision of most points upon which the
successful conduct of an action depended.” Id.
16 THE TWELVE TABLES, TABLE NINE (T. Lambert Mears trans.), reprinted in T. LAMBERT
MEARS, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, THE TWELVE TABLES, AND THE CXVIIITH
AND CXXVIITH NOVELS 588 (1882).
17 MOYLE, supra note 14, at 4.
18 Id. (citation omitted).
19 See THE TWELVE TABLES, supra note 16, at 588.
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underlying deprivation, but rather with the political institution that determined
whether the deprivation would occur.20  Even as the Republic transitioned into
the Empire some five centuries later, this basic law remained in effect and was
not superseded until some 984 years after its enactment by the promulgation of
the Justinian Code.21  Although it might be a stretch to claim that contemporary
due process was first forged in the Roman assembly, the parallels between
Tabula Nona and the Fourteenth Amendment are clearly discernable.
With the conquest of southern Britannia by the Emperor Claudius in A.D.
43, Tabula Nona and the rest of Roman culture began to influence the barbarian
tribes of modern Great Britain.22  British society had achieved a modicum of
development by the time the first legions arrived, but it was also plagued with
recurring warfare and tribal unrest.23  As Rome’s presence expanded across the
island, however, the Empire’s homogenizing influence began to permeate most
areas of life until it redefined even the very nature of criminal procedure.24
With respect to the charge of treason, Roman law established that:
the death penalty was not pronounced unless the accused confessed or all witnesses
agreed; the testimony of one witness alone, no matter what his rank, was insufficient
[to convict]; all evidence had to be given on oath; a person was not legally accused
until the accusation had been presented in writing; and a quick trial was mandatory.25
Three and a half centuries later, political decay and external assault had
weakened Rome’s authority to the point that British forces were recalled from
their garrisons to defend the imperial heartland against attack.26  In the midst of
this military vacuum, Britannia was quickly left to its own defense, inevitably
resulting in its subjugation by the invading Saxons—the Germanic tribe who
quickly “became their tyrants, and formed seven Saxon kingdoms upon the
ruins of the conquered country.”27  Although the history of the Saxon heptar-
chy is notable in its own right, it was not until the reign of Alfred the Great in
the late 800s that this feudal society developed one of the defining attributes of
modern due process:
20 The Comitia Centuriata “was exclusively taken to represent the State as embodied for
military operations.  [It], therefore, had all powers which may be supposed to be properly
lodged with a General commanding an army, and, among them, it had authority to . . . inflict
capital punishment. . . . So long as criminal jurisdiction was confined to the legislature . . . it
was easy to prefer indictments for graver crimes . . . .” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 387-88 (2d ed. 1863).
21 MOYLE, supra note 14, at 15.
22 See LEONHARD SCHMITZ, A MANUAL OF ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY 251 (1857).
23 EDWARD CONYBEARE, ROMAN BRITAIN 52 (1903) (“Tribes absorbed or destroyed by con-
quering tribes, tribes confederating with others under a fresh name, this or that chief becom-
ing a new eponymous hero,—such is the ceaseless spectacle of unrest of which the history of
ancient Britain gives us glimpses.”).
24 See id. at 165-66 (“So profound was the quiet that for a whole generation Britain vanishes
from history altogether. . . . But we may be sure that under such rulers . . . Roman civiliza-
tion was getting an even firmer hold.”).
25 Note, Historical Concept of Treason:  English, American, 35 IND. L.J. 70, 71 (1959).
26 CARADOC OF LHANCARVAN, THE HISTORY OF WALES 1 (Powell trans.) (1774) (“When the
Roman empire . . . became sensibly unable to repress the perpetual incursions of the Goths,
Huns, Vandals, and other barbarous invaders; it was found necessary to abandon the remot-
est Parts . . . and to recal [sic] the Roman forces that defended them, the better to secure the
inward, and the provinces most exposed to the depredations of the Barbarians.”).
27 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A HISTORY AND DEFENCE OF MAGNA CHARTA ii (1769).
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Convinced that oppression naturally follows power, to screen the humble from the
tyranny of the great, [Alfred] instituted trials by jury; by which, in all criminal cases
it was ordained, that twelve men should decide whether the accused person was
guilty of the offence laid to his charge or not, and that the judge should pronounce
sentence agreeably to their verdict.  These twelve jurymen were chosen from
amongst the peers of the delinquent. . . . The peers of the realm . . . [were to be]
judged by those of their own rank; that is, by the rest of the lords; and the commoners
by their equals also.  The only difference between the lords and commons in this
matter, [was], that every peer ha[d] a right to give his voice at the trial of any culprit,
of the former denomination; and that twelve men only, [were] to acquit or condemn
any person that [was] classed amongst the latter.28
With the introduction of jury trials into Saxon law, Alfred the Great helped lay
an important judicial foundation upon which future kings built.  This corner-
stone of liberty was so important that when William the Conqueror was
crowned on Christmas Day in 1066, he “made a compact to insure the liberties
of his subjects, by swearing the same coronation oath which had usually been
taken by the Saxon monarchs.”29  William’s ascension meant that Saxon rule
was finally at an end, but, like the Romans who had gone before, Saxon culture
had left its mark.
THE RISE OF MAGNA CHARTA
By itself, a discussion of Romano-Saxon British culture does not shed an
abundance of light on the contemporary meaning of the due process clause.
Nevertheless, it is important to have such a familiarity to appreciate the histori-
cal context and legal tradition that gave rise to the Magna Charta.  Ratified by
King John in 1215, this “Great Charter of Liberty” is conventionally regarded
as embodying “the undoubted inheritance of England, being their antient [sic]
and approved laws; so antient [sic], that they seem to be of the same standing
with the nation . . . [having] passed through all the British, Roman, Danish,
Saxon, and Norman times, with little or no alteration in the main.”30
It is commonly overlooked that the Great Charter of Liberty was not the
first of its kind.31  Rather, by the time William the Conqueror’s great-great-
grandson King John was forced to place his seal upon the parchment at Runny-
mede, more than 113 years had passed since his great-grandfather, Henry I, had
done nearly the same thing with a voluntary charter outlining the liberties of the
British people.32  However, because of the era’s illiteracy rate and the sheer
passage of time, the movement to restore the kingdom’s ancient laws and liber-
ties did not truly begin until an archbishop showed a copy of Henry’s faded
charter to the earls and barons at Bury St. Edmunds.33  Armed with the knowl-
edge Henry’s charter provided, a group of nobles assembled in a small country
28 Id. at iii-iv.  “Peers of the Realm” included Princes, Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts,
and Barons. JOHN BRYDALL, JUS IMAGINIS APUD ANGLOS; OR THE LAW OF ENGLAND
RELATING TO THE NOBILITY & GENTRY 5 (1675).
29 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at vi.
30 Id. at 3-4.
31 Id. at 5.
32 Id. at 7. See infra Appendix for the text of the Coronation Charter of Henry I.
33 JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 7.
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church on an autumn day to swear before the altar of God “[t]hat, if the King
should refuse to confirm by his charter the said laws and liberties (being the
rights of the kingdom) they would make war upon him till he did.”34
After introducing their proposal to the King at Christmas, the following
Easter:
[F]ive and forty Barons, with two thousand Knights, and all their retainers, met in
arms at Stamford; they proceeded to Brakesley, in the direction of Oxford, where the
King then was; and at Brakesley, on Easter Monday, the Primate and the Earl of
Pembroke met them, and required on the King’s part to know their specific
demands.35
After reiterating the oath they had sworn the previous fall concerning the
confirmation of their ancient liberties, the barons then delivered to the King’s
messengers a list of the rights and privileges for which they sought restora-
tion.36  “When their demands were stated to John by [Archbishop] Langton,
[however], he asked, why they did not demand his kingdom also, and swore
that he would never grant them liberties, which should make himself a slave.”37
Being thus repulsed, the barons quickly made good on their oath to make
war against the King.  Siege walls went up around Northampton, Bedford
quickly fell into their hands, and soon thereafter, the barons “were invited to
London, with assurance that the gates should be opened in the night, by some
of the chief citizens.”38  Finding himself outmaneuvered through strength and
subterfuge, “John then felt the necessity of submission” and finally placed his
seal upon the Magna Charta at Runnymede.39  While many of the provisions in
the document dealt with relatively mundane subjects,40 the Charter also con-
tained a clause of incalculable importance:  “No freeman shall be taken, nor
imprisoned, nor disseized, nor out-lawed, nor exiled, nor destroyed in any man-
ner; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by the lawful judgment
of his peers, or by the law of the land.”41
It had been more than 1600 years since the language of Tabula Nona had
been etched in the Roman assembly and nearly 1200 years since the imperial
legions had carried it across the English Channel.42  In that time, the manifesta-
tion of sovereign authority had shifted as the Comitia Centuriata eventually
gave way to the Roman emperors and then to the British kings.  Yet through it
all, the idea remained that the people possessed certain fundamental liberties
that could not be wantonly ignored.  In 1354, Edward III further refined this
principle with the adoption of the Liberty of Subject Act, which established that
“no man, of what estate or condition soever, shall be put out of land or tene-
34 Id. at 8.
35 ROBERT SOUTHEY, THE BOOK OF THE CHURCH 165 (4th ed. 1837).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 166.
40 Indicative of such measures is the provision that “[a]ll merchants may, with safety and
security, go out of England, and come into England, and stay, and pass through England by
land and water, to buy and sell without any evil tolls . . . .” JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 207.
41 Id.
42 See supra notes 14, 22 and accompanying text.
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ment, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without
being brought in answer by due process of law.”43
Believed to be the first recorded use of the phrase “due process of law,”
this statute, along with the Magna Charta before it, helped solidify centuries of
ancient Romano-Saxon British liberties into a more comprehensible form.44
Notable as this development was, however, it is even more remarkable consid-
ering how little the underlying principle had changed in the course of eighteen
centuries:
[450 B.C.] Only the great comitium has the right of legislating so as to inflict a pun-
ishment on a citizen involving his life, his liberty, or his civic rights.45
[A.D. 1215] No freeman shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor disseized, nor outlawed,
nor exiled, nor destroyed in any manner; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn
him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.46
[A.D. 1354]  No man, of what estate or condition soever, shall be put out of land or
tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due process of law.47
Even though the underlying notion that certain fundamental rights could
not be taken away without adhering to some process remained relatively
unchanged for nearly two-thousand years, one important structural change took
place.  When the Twelve Tables were first placed in the Roman forum, the
Tabula Nona charged the Comitia Centuriata—a legislative assembly—with
passing judgment on punishments involving a deprivation of life, liberty, or
civic rights.48  However, thirteenth-century England had no comparable legisla-
tive institution.  In fact, Parliament would not become a fully functioning legis-
lature for another two-hundred years; moreover, any ad hoc committee the king
summoned often lacked the power to provide anything more than an advisory
opinion.49
In the absence of a legislative assembly like the ancient Comitia, the
champions of the Magna Charta realized that some other form of popular pro-
tection was necessary to safeguard the people’s liberties against royal encroach-
ment.  The result, as seen through the language of the Magna Charta, was an
43 2 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 433 (1826); accord WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE,
MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES 22 (1916).
44 GUTHRIE, supra note 43, at 22.
45 THE TWELVE TABLES, supra note 16, at 588 (excerpt from the Tabula Nona).
46 MAGNA CHARTA cl. 39, reprinted in  JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 207.
47 HUME, supra note 43, at 433 (citing Liberty of Subject Act, 28 Edward III cap. 3 (1354)).
48 See THE TWELVE TABLES, supra note 16, at 588.
49 B.C. SKOTTOWE, A SHORT HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT 17 (1886).  During the reign of
Henry IV:
It was natural that a king whose sole title was that of election by Parliament . . . should be
compelled to assume to a very large extent the position of constitutional monarch . . . . The old
rights, therefore, were asserted and exercised with the regularity of routine, and completed by a
few fresh improvements.  The entire control of taxation was finally assured to the Commons by
their successful assertion, in 1407, of the axiom that all money-bills must originate in the Lower
House.  Their right to concur in legislation was placed on a firmer footing by the practice . . . of
bringing in their petitions in the form of complete statutes, under the name of Bills, with the view
of insuring that, for the future, the laws entered on the rolls of Parliament should correspond
exactly to their desires.
Id.
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appeal to the ancient customs and laws of the country:  a recognition that no
freeman would be deprived of his fundamental rights to life, liberty, or property
except through “the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”50
This reference to “the law of the land” is particularly significant since “[t]hese
rights and liberties belonged to all the people of England, and they adhered in
each person as a person.  Their force did not depend on their written delinea-
tion; they existed in the customary or unwritten law of England that went back
to time immemorial.”51
Nearly three centuries after the Liberty of Subject Act, Edward Coke’s
famous Institutes on the Laws of England further illuminated the relationship
between “the law of the land” and “due process of law.”  As described in the
Second Part of the Institutes:
For the true sense and exposition of these words [but by the law of the land], see the
statute [Edward’s Liberty of Subject Act] where the words, by the law of the land,
are rendred [sic] without due process of law . . . that is, by indictment or presentment
of good and lawfull [sic] men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or by writ
originall [sic] of the common law.
. . . .
No man [may] be put to answer without presentment before justices, or thing of
record, or by due process, or by writ originall [sic], according to the old law of the
land.  Wherein it is to be observed, that this chapter is but declaratory of the old law
of England.52
Additionally, the following page of the Institutes evidences that “Coke’s mind
[was] fixed upon the matter of procedure” when postulating on this connection
between due process and law of the land:53
[H]ere it is to be knowne [sic], in what cases a man by the law of the land, may be
taken, arrested, attached, or imprisoned . . . . [I]t is to be understood, that proces [sic]
of law is two fold, viz.  By the kings writ, or by due proceeding, and warrant, either
in deed, or in law without writ.54
Thus, Edward III’s “due process of law” was simply a synonym for John’s “law
of the land” in the Magna Charta.55
TWO REVOLUTIONS AND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM
Although the rights and liberties outlined in the Magna Charta were sup-
posed to represent the inalienable heritage of the British people, due process of
the law was not always diligently observed.  For example, in 1627:
King Charles I attempted to raise money by forced loans [and] five English knights
resisted, [causing] Charles [to have] the resisters arbitrarily imprisoned.  This in turn
led to the popular reinvocation of the Magna Carta and the reiteration of the rights of
50 See MAGNA CHARTA cl. 39, reprinted in JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 207.
51 Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV.
1421, 1423 (1999).
52 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50
(1797) (emphasis added).
53 1 ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN & ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 614 (1914).
54 COKE, supra note 52, at 51.
55 MCLAUGHLIN & HART, supra note 53, at 614.
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a subject to his property and to no imprisonment without the legal judgment of his
peers.56
After Charles’s execution for treason, Cromwell’s personal rule as Lord
Protector, and the restoration of a weakened monarchy in the Glorious Revolu-
tion of 1688, a victorious Parliament “set forth a Declaration of Rights that
quickly became enshrined in English constitutionalism . . . . [It] declared illegal
certain actions of the crown . . . [and] asserted certain rights and freedoms
possessed by Englishmen . . . .”57  As Wood writes:
So convinced were Englishmen in the decades following 1689 that tyranny
could come only from a single ruler that they could hardly conceive of the people
tyrannizing themselves.  Once Parliament became sovereign . . . the English people
lost much of their former interest in codifying and listing their personal rights. . . .
. . . .
By the time of the American Revolution, therefore, most educated Englishmen
had become convinced that their rights existed only against the crown.  Against their
representative and sovereign Parliament, which was the guardian of these rights, they
existed not at all.58
This attitude of unwavering faith in popular assemblies quickly took hold in
post-Revolution America.59  Within a few years, however, “the democratic des-
potism that had seemed so illogical and contradictory in the years 1775 and
1776 had become only too real for many of the gentry leaders. . . . [U]nlike
England, the representative legislatures were the source of the problem, not the
solution,” and as a result, “some other bulwark for individual rights would have
to be found.”60  As Corwin observed, these early legislatures were prone to
pass:
all sorts of “special legislation” . . . that is, enactments setting aside judgments, sus-
pending the general law for the benefit of individuals, interpreting the law for partic-
ular cases, and so on and so forth.  So long, of course, as there were Tories to attaint
of treason this species of legislative activity had some excuse, but hardly was this
necessity past than it came into great disrepute even with some of the best friends of
democracy, by whom is was denounced not only as oppressive but as not properly
within legislative power at all.61
With the ratification of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution in 1791,62 the Founding Fathers sought to incorporate a bulwark into the
56 Wood, supra note 51, at 1424-25.
57 Id. at 1425.
58 Id. at 1425-26.
59
“Many thought that the new state legislatures, as the representatives of the people, could
do for the public whatever the people entrusted them to do.  Some argued that the needs of
the public could even override the rights of individuals.  Did not the collective power of the
people . . . supercede [sic] the rights of the few?” Id. at 1433.
60 Id. at 1434-35 (emphasis added).  “[I]n the new republics, where there were no more
prerogative rights, could the people’s personal rights meaningfully exist apart from the peo-
ple’s sovereign power expressed in their assemblies? . . . What was the need of protecting
the people’s rights from themselves?” Id. at 1434.
61 Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV.
L. REV. 366, 375 (1911).
62
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
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heart of the national order.  In choosing the language that would comprise the
federal due process clause, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment relied on a
similar clause that existed in nearly all of the earlier pre-American state consti-
tutions.63  Pennsylvania’s constitution, for instance, held that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused . . . cannot be compelled to give evidence against
himself; nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”64  Similarly, Maryland’s constitu-
tion stated that its citizens were:
entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course
of that law . . . .
. . . .
That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to
have remedy, by the course of the law of the land . . . .
. . . .
That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the
law of the land.65
Even in the Northwest Ordinance, an act passed by the Confederate Congress
in 1787 and modified by the United States Congress in 1789, the fundamental
language of the Magna Charta was recognizable:  “No man shall be deprived of
his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the
land . . . .”66
Unlike the circumstances faced by the drafters of the Magna Charta, how-
ever, the circumstances before the drafters of the Fifth Amendment did not
force them to be on guard against the usurpations of a tyrannical monarch, but
rather against the potential—and equally-undesirable—usurpations of a tyran-
nical populace.67 Absent a constitutional check on popular will, there was no
way to stop one segment of the population from cheerfully voting away the
fundamental rights of another.  A deprivation of life or liberty would be no less
unjust merely because a legislature dictated it rather than a king.  Due process
of law thus performed a critical function; it ensured that popular sovereignty
did not degenerate into a form of mob rule cloaked with the auspices of politi-
cal legitimacy.68
Useful as the concept of due process was, however, the nation would
quickly discover that its practical definition left much to be desired.  In Mur-
ray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,69 a case considering
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis
added).
63 See THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 121, 149-52 (John Conrad & Co. 1804)
(1787).
64 Id. at 121.
65 Id. at 149-52.
66 Id. at 320.
67 See Corwin, supra note 61, at 375.
68 See id. at 379 (recognizing that without protection, “what the legislature had given, the
legislature could take away”).
69 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
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whether the procedure for collecting a customs debt violated the Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process clause, the Supreme Court noted:
That the warrant now in question is legal process, is not denied.  It was issued in
conformity with an act of Congress.  But is it “due process of law”?  The constitution
contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid.
It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether [some-
thing is] due process.  It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to
enact any process which might be devised.  The [Fifth Amendment] is a restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and
cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process “due process of
law,” by its mere will.70
While it was clear that the government could not enact just any provision in the
name of “due process of law,” the Court also recognized the challenge of artic-
ulating where the limit of this power should lie.  After all, it was one thing to
say that “[t]he words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to con-
vey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in [the] Magna
Charta,”71 and another matter entirely to determine whether a particular statute
met this centuries-old standard:
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether [a] process, enacted by
congress, is due process?  To this the answer must be twofold.  We must examine the
constitution itself, to see whether [the] process be in conflict with any of its provi-
sions.  If not found to be so, we must [then] look to those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration
of our ancestors . . . .72
With the adoption of the English common law as the judicial foundation of
the states, questions inevitably arose over time about the appropriate meaning
of “due process of law.”73  Although Justice Curtis clearly signaled in Murray
that due process was “undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the
words, ‘by the law of the land,’” in the Magna Charta,74 what did the phrase
“the law of the land” mean?  Certainly, there was etymological support for the
70 Id. at 276.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 276-77.  Reflecting on the interplay between “due process” and “the law of the
land,” the Court noted that:
Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they mean due process of law.
The constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the formation of the
federal constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely, generally con-
tained the words, “but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” . . .
. . . To have followed, as in the state constitutions . . . the words of Magna Charta, and
declared that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of
his peers or the law of the land, would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate.  To have
taken the clause, “law of the land,” without its immediate context, might possibly have given rise
to doubts, which would be effectually dispelled by using those words which the great commenta-
tor on Magna Charta had declared to be the true meaning of the phrase, “law of the land,” in that
instrument, and which were undoubtedly then received as their true meaning.
Id. at 276.
73 Percy Werner, National Common Law, 8 S. L. REV. 414, 416 (1882) (“Every State in the
Union has now adopted the common law of England . . . with the single exception of Louisi-
ana, and she has adopted it by statute to supply the deficiency of her Criminal Code.”).
74 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
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conclusion that these terms were interchangeable,75 but, absent something
more, it appeared the Court had merely substituted one linguistic uncertainty
for another.
The term “law of the land” had a long-established meaning by the time
Justice Curtis rendered it synonymous with “due process of law,” whether or
not he intended to adopt that meaning.  As early as 1689, legal commentators
routinely referred to “the Common Law of the Land” when speaking about the
principle.76  In the war-making context, they observed that “[n]one can levy
War within this Realm, without Authority from the King, for to him only it
belongeth to levy War, by the Common Law of the Land; to do otherwise, is
High Treason, by the said Common Law.”77 Likewise, courts in criminal cases
recognized that one who makes an affirmative allegation “ought to make pre-
cise Proof of it, especially in the Case of a Penal Law made against the Com-
mon Law of the Land; for by the Common Law the Acceptance of a second
Benefice was not any Avoidance of the first”78 or, as stated in the 1737 Univer-
sal Etymological English Dictionary, simply the “common law.”79
The historical view of the common law as a set of judge-made rules does
not differ greatly from its contemporary meaning.  A Parliamentary resolution
passed in 1710 addressing the pleading standard for certain types of criminal
complaints evidences the striking similarity between the historical and contem-
porary meanings of common law:
Because we conceive the Law of the Land, is as much the Rule of Judicature, as
it is in Inferior Courts of Justice; and since by the Opinion of all the Judges in all
Prosecutions by Information or Indictment, for writing or speaking, the particular
words suppos’d to be Criminal, must be expressly specified in such Information or
Indictment; and that this is the Law of the Land confirm’d by constant Practice, we
conceive, that there is the same Reason, and Justice for specifying in Impeachments,
the particular words suppos’d to be Criminal, for otherwise a Person who is Innocent,
and Safe by the Law out of Parliament, may nevertheless be condemn’d in
Parliament.80
Given the abundance of historical support that “the law of the land” is
synonymous with “the common law,” the Supreme Court’s decision in Murray
to equate the term with “due process of law” rationally appears to establish a
legal regime under which due process of law = law of the land = common law
or, more simply, due process of law = common law.  However, questions
remain on how this algebraic simplification works.  Does it refer to the judicial
procedures of the common law or to some substantive limitation placed upon
75 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
76 J. FRASER, AGREEMENT BETWIXT THE PRESENT AND THE FORMER GOVERNMENT 61
(1689).
77 David Jenkins, A Remonstrance to the Lords and Commons of the Two Houses of Parlia-
ment at Westminster, the 21st of February, 1647 in 4 A COLLECTION OF SCARCE AND VALU-
ABLE TRACTS, ON THE MOST INTERESTING AND ENTERTAINING SUBJECTS 451, 453 (1748).
78 Sharpe v. French, in 2 THE REPORTS OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT ON DIVERS
EXCEPTIONS TAKEN TO PLEADINGS, AND OTHER MATTERS IN LAW 544-45 (1718).
79 N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1737).
80 ABEL BOYER, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE, DIGESTED INTO ANNALS
YEAR THE EIGHTH 296 (1710) (emphasis added).
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it?  As Representative Barbour of the Twentieth Congress put it twenty-seven
years earlier:
The law of the land, instead of being locked up in the bosom of the legislator, is
made known to the people; and instead of consisting of a set of hasty fragments or
sentences, pronounced as the cases occur, it consists of general rules of action, not
spending their force in individual cases, but applying to the whole community.81
Due process could thus be seen as a common-law procedural focus since “when
the [F]ifth [A]mendment prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property,
but by due course of law, it follows that [the law is exercised] in a regular
proceeding before a judicial tribunal.”82
THE PRIMITIVE BIRTH OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Twelve months after the Supreme Court linked “due process of law” and
“the law of the land” in Murray, it decided another case that would shake the
nation to its moral core and pioneer much of the confusion surrounding the
modern understanding of substantive due process.  In 1819-20, thirty-five years
before Murray, a contentious debate raged in Congress over whether to admit
Missouri into the Union as a slave state.83  Given the political climate of the
time, such an event would have upset the delicate balance that existed between
slave states and free states such that “the preponderance of power in the Senate
would [have been] handed over to the South.  This the representatives from the
North were determined to prevent . . . .”84
With Maine’s petition seeking admission as a free state, a compromise
was reached whereby Missouri would be admitted as a slave state, Maine
would be admitted as a free state, and “the remainder of the Louisiana territory
north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude” would be admitted
as free states in the future.85  After residing for several years in “free” territory
with various masters, a slave named Dred Scott petitioned the courts for an
adjudication of freedom.  He argued that he and his family were no longer
slaves because the Missouri Compromise prohibited slavery in many of the
areas in which he and his family had lived.86  Rejecting Dred Scott’s claims,
the Supreme Court declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional and
held that:
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws,
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.87
81 10 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 182-83 (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1859) (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
83 HENRY WILLIAM ELSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 460 (1904).
84 LUCIEN CARR, MISSOURI:  A BONE OF CONTENTION 140 (1888).
85 ELSON, supra note 83, at 460.
86 See ELBERT WILLIAM R. EWING, LEGAL AND HISTORICAL STATUS OF THE DRED SCOTT
DECISION 24 (1909).
87 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856).  The Court also attempted to
address Congress’s ability to impose certain regulations, holding that “the act of Congress
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At first blush, it might appear as if Chief Justice Taney had been mistaken,
or at the very least, analytically inconsistent.  Specifically, it appeared incon-
gruous to say that the Missouri Compromise deprived a slave owner of his or
her “property” without due process of law when Congress passed plenty of
laws each year that routinely deprived citizens of their property based upon
territorial consideration.  Moreover, it seemed nonsensical that Congress lacked
the power to regulate the property status of slavery when it could pass a 100%
ad valorem tax on any shipment of brandy a citizen brought into the United
States.88  In both instances, an act of Congress deprived a citizen of some
amount of property merely because that property was brought into “a particular
Territory of the United States,” and yet one act was perfectly constitutional
while the other was not.
Arguably, much of the confusion surrounding the due process clause
begins to emerge here in Scott v. Sandford.  Although Justice Taney used the
language of the Fifth Amendment to attack the legality of the Missouri Com-
promise, he used this language in a particularly unique way.  Viewing the
excerpt from his opinion once again, it actually contains two parts—first, a
reference to the act itself and second, a challenge to its underlying effect:
“[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property [part one], merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law [part two].”89  The problem with
the Missouri Compromise, it would seem, was not so much that Congress had
deprived a citizen of his property, but rather that Congress had deprived the
citizen of this particular kind of property in a way that was inherently incom-
patible with due process.90
In contrast with this viewpoint, Justice Curtis in his dissent argued that the
history and application of the due process clause did not support such a sub-
stantively concerned result.  Although the following excerpt from his opinion is
lengthy, it nevertheless provides a strong constitutional argument for why the
Missouri Compromise did not infringe upon the due process clause:
The only [prohibition] suggested is that clause in the fifth article of the amend-
ments of the Constitution which declares that no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]his restriction on the legislative power is not peculiar to the Constitution
of the United States; it was borrowed from Magna Charta; was brought to America
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the [affected]
territory . . . is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void . . . .” Id. at 452.
88 E.D. OGDEN, TARIFF, OR RATES OF DUTIES PAYABLE ON GOODS, WARES, AND MERCHAN-
DISE IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (1846).
89 Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450 (emphasis added).
90 It is worth noting that, at least to some in Congress, the common law could also contain a
legislative element.  Quoting Senator Roberts from the 1816 debate on commerce with Great
Britain, “The gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Mason) says the ‘law of the land’ is a
common law term; but are we thence to go to common law legislation to learn how the
Executive can make treaties the law of the land?” JOSEPH GALES, THE DEBATES AND PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (FOURTEENTH CONGRESS—FIRST SES-
SION) 71 (1854).
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by our ancestors . . . and has existed in all the States, usually in the very words of the
great charter.  It existed in every political community in America in 1787, when the
ordinance prohibiting slavery north and west of the Ohio was passed.
And if a prohibition of slavery in a Territory in 1820 violated this principle of
Magna Charta, the ordinance of 1787 also violated it . . . . I think I may at least say,
if the Congress did then violate Magna Charta by the ordinance, no one discovered
that violation.  Besides, if the prohibition upon all persons, citizens as well as others,
to bring slaves into a Territory, and a declaration that if brought they shall be free,
deprives citizens of their property without due process of law, what shall we say of
the legislation of many of the slaveholding States which have enacted the same pro-
hibition?  As early as October, 1778, a law was passed in Virginia, that thereafter no
slave should be imported into that Commonwealth by sea or by land, and that every
slave who should be imported should become free.  A citizen of Virginia purchased
in Maryland a slave who belonged to another citizen of Virginia, and removed with
the slave to Virginia.  The slave sued for her freedom, and recovered it . . . and a
similar law has been recognized as valid in Maryland.  I am not aware that such laws,
though they exist in many States, were ever supposed to be in conflict with the prin-
ciple of Magna Charta incorporated into the State Constitutions.  It was certainly
understood by the Convention which framed the Constitution, and has been so under-
stood ever since, that, under the power to regulate commerce, Congress could pro-
hibit the importation of slaves . . . . A citizen of the United States owns slaves in
Cuba, and brings them to the United States, where they are set free by the legislation
of Congress.  Does this legislation deprive him of his property without due process of
law?  If so, what becomes of the laws prohibiting the slave trade?  If not, how can
similar regulation respecting a Territory violate the fifth amendment of the
Constitution?
. . . .
For these reasons, I am of opinion that so much of the several acts of Congress
as prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude within that part of the Territory of
Wisconsin lying north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, and west of
the river Mississippi, were constitutional and valid laws.91
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
With the advent of the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Sandford, the
political tensions over slavery that had been quietly simmering for decades
finally began to boil over:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Sandford sent shockwaves through all
parts of American life.  When “the opinion of the court, as written by Chief Justice
Taney of Maryland, adjudged the Missouri Compromise law unconstitutional, indig-
nation became open rebellion.  The Republican party, the abolitionists, and Northern
States repudiated the decision, and declared that . . . Congress should and would treat
the decision as a nullity.”  What had begun as one man’s humble quest for freedom
had morphed into “nothing short of the nullification of Federal power.”92
Five years later, the first shells of war were fired at Fort Sumter and eleven
states seceded from the Union.93  By the time the Civil War ended in 1865,
91 Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 624, 626-27, 633 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
92 Jason A. Crook, Toward a More “Perfect” Union:  The Untimely Decline of Federalism
and the Rise of the Homogenous Political Culture, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 47, 55-56 (2008).
93 1 THE COMTE DE PARIS, HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA 138 (1875).
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more than 620,000 Americans would lie dead, and the disruption to civilian
infrastructure and legal institutions was as severe as it was unprecedented.94
Eight months after the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Courthouse,
“Mr. Stevens, the Republican leader in the House, introduced a joint resolution
proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”95  Many in
Congress recognized that:
the defect of the Republic [was] that there was no express grant of power in the
Constitution to enable Congress to enforce the requirements of the Constitution . . .
and . . . that the provisions of the immortal Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitu-
tion rested for their execution and enforcement [solely] upon the fidelity of the
States.96
As the “fidelity” of the states had recently been tested by the fires of civil war,
the Congressional leadership believed that the federal government should have
“the power to enforce, in every State of the Union, the Bill of Rights, as found
in the first eight Amendments” if the nation was to achieve the twin goals of
political and social reconstruction.97
The result, after much deliberation and no small amount of controversy,
was the Fourteenth Amendment.98  Addressing a number of post-war issues
such as the status of the confederate debt and the loyalty requirements for
southern representatives, the Amendment also contained a number of long-
range constitutional enhancements, including the privileges and immunities
clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause.99
94 William Thaddeus Coleman, Jr., Truths That Unfortunately Were Not, and Still Are Not,
Sufficiently Self-Evident, 148 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 434, 443 (2004).
95 HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 56 (1908).
96 Id. at 56-57.
97 Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
By the Thirteenth Amendment . . . the freedom of the negro race was assured, but their rights
were still at the mercy of State legislation.  Some of the former slave states passed laws espe-
cially directed against the negro race . . . . In some instances they were denied the right to appear
in the towns, except in the capacity of menial servants.  They were denied the right to purchase
land.  They were not permitted to testify in cases where a white man was a party.  It was felt that
national protection was necessary for the freedmen, and the Fourteenth Amendment was pro-
posed to the States, and declared ratified in July, 1868.
LUCIUS POLK MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 19-20
(1906).
98 FLACK, supra note 95, at 57.  As Ransom H. Gillet, a member of the Twenty-Third and
Twenty-Fourth Congresses, wrote:
On the 16th of June, 1866, this amendment was transmitted to the several States by the
Secretary of State.  Tennessee, it is claimed, adopted it on the 12th of July, 1866, and thereupon
Congress passed a joint resolution, approved by the President, admitting her into the Union, and
her Senators and members to seats.  Prior to March, 1867, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, ten in all, rejected
it.  Iowa, California, and Nebraska have not acted upon it.  Twenty States have ratified it.  This
proposed amendment has not been sufficiently ratified to become a part of the Constitution, nor
is it expected it ever will.
RANSOM H. GILLET, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 319-20 (1868).
99 Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
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Although the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment spoke very little
about the meaning of due process when proposing the Amendment, what little
they did say suggests a measure of continuity with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Murray.  In response to a question from Representative Rogers about
what was meant by “due process of law,” Representative Bingham famously—
if not opaquely—remarked that “the courts have settled that long ago, and the
gentleman can go and read their decisions.”100  Frustratingly brief though it
might have been, this response is nevertheless significant because it suggests
that the Amendment’s drafters did not have a fundamentally different under-
standing of due process beyond that which the Supreme Court had already
articulated.
Even the Fourteenth Amendment’s phrasing supports the premise that its
due process clause was meant to conform in both spirit and effect to the Fifth
Amendment’s conceptual understanding.  Viewed together below, one can see
that beyond the introductory “no state/no person” language, the two clauses
share the same core words “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law” even down to the precise placement of the commas:
[The Fifth Amendment] “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”101
[The Fourteenth Amendment] “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”102
Shortly after its ratification, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause was synonymous in meaning to the Fifth
Amendment.103  Whereas the Fifth Amendment only applies to the federal gov-
ernment, the Fourteenth Amendment extended the due process requirement to
the States:
Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the security of the citizens of
the several States for due process of law in proceedings by the State lay in its institu-
tions alone.  Even if due process was denied, the federal government had no right to
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
103 As the Court held in In re Kemmler:
As due process of law in the Fifth Amendment referred to that law of the land which derives its
authority from the legislative powers conferred on Congress by the Constitution of the United
States . . . so, in the Fourteenth Amendment, the same words refer to that law of the land in each
State . . . exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions.
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890).  Shortly thereafter:
In 1901, the [C]ourt, having occasion to consider the meaning of due process in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments [once again], said [in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S.
324]:  “While the language of those amendments is the same, yet as they were engrafted upon the
Constitution at different times and in widely different circumstances of our national life, it may
be that questions may arise in which different constructions and applications of their provision
may be proper.”  But in the decision of the case before it, the court proceeded “on the assumption
that the legal import of the phrase, ‘due process of law,’ is the same in both amendments.”
MCGEHEE, supra note 97, at 35.
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interfere.  The Fourteenth Amendment changed this condition of affairs.  It made it a
matter of national concern that the State should not deny due process to its citizens
and to others.  It gave to the United States the right to supervise the performance of
this duty, and transferred from the State to the Federal Supreme Court the ultimate
decision on the question of the presence of due process in all proceedings affecting
life, liberty, and property.104
This transfer of supervisory authority away from the states granted the
federal government the power to review the subject matter of state regulations,
which were previously beyond its constitutional reach.105  Four years later, the
Supreme Court considered the propriety of one such regulation when a consor-
tium of butchers brought suit against a state-established slaughterhouse
monopoly.106
On March 8, 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed a law “to protect the
health of the city of New Orleans, to locate the stock-landings and slaughter-
houses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaugh-
ter-House Company.”107  This act declared that:
the company . . . shall have the sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carry-
ing on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within the limits and privi-
lege granted by the act, and that all such animals shall be landed at the stock-landings
and slaughtered at the slaughter-houses of the company, and nowhere else.108
Aggrieved at this monopolistic grant, the plaintiffs—a group of independent
butchers—argued that it “deprive[d] them of their property [the right to exer-
cise their trade] without due process of law; contrary to the provisions of the
first section of the fourteenth article of amendment” while also “abridg[ing]
the[ir] privileges and immunities [as] citizens of the United States.”109
Aware of the case’s political significance, the Supreme Court took care in
giving constructive meaning to the Amendment’s provisions.110  While focus-
ing the majority of its opinion on a discussion of the Amendment’s privileges
and immunities clause, the Court also observed that in interpreting the due pro-
cess clause it was necessary “to look to the purpose which we have said was the
pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and
the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was
supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.”111
Additionally, with respect to the due process clause, the court observed:
104 MCGEHEE, supra note 97, at 35-36.
105 Id.
106 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
107 Id. at 59.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 66.  The plaintiffs argued that “[t]he right to labor . . . is past doubt property, and
property of a sacred kind.  Yet this property is destroyed by the act; destroyed not by due
process of law, but by charter . . . .” Id. at 56.
110 Id. at 67.
not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us.  No ques-
tions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people
of this country, and so important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States, and of
the several States to each other and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have
been before this court during the official life of any of its present members.
Id.
111 Id. at 72.
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The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the defendant’s
charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law . . . . [This
clause, however,] has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth amend-
ment, as a restraint upon the Federal power.  It is also to be found in some form of
expression in the constitutions of nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power
of the States.  This law then, has practically been the same as it now is during the
existence of the government, except so far as the present amendment may place the
restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal
Government.112
Even though the act was upheld and the Court found that no construction of the
due process clause allowed the Court to hold that the Louisiana law was a
deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,113
this decision was notable because the federal Supreme Court passed judgment
on a purely state regulation.114
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE STATES
In the 2300 years between the Decemvirate’s consolidation of the Roman
law115 and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the principle underly-
ing the due process clause had undergone a number of important evolutionary
changes.  What had first appeared as a quasi-judicial oversight by a Roman
assembly had morphed into an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against royal encroach-
ment before finally transitioning into an American protection against
unchecked legislative power.116  Although the historical development of this
clause suggests a principal concern with ensuring that certain procedural safe-
guards were in place,117 it is important to consider the interpretation the various
states gave to it before a more complete picture can emerge.
Based on an in-depth review of more than two hundred cases decided
between 1845 and 1875, this author concludes that due process of law was
understood as a strictly procedural concept and, at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, the country’s leading jurists did not contemplate a
substantive dimension.  For the sake of brevity, this Article highlights excerpts
from the opinions of ten cases randomly selected from this body of law to
provide textual support for this premise.118
Beginning in 1857, the Massachusetts decision in Merriam v. Sewall,119 a
case in which creditors sought to attach claims to an estate, clearly supports this
procedural view of due process.  There, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
found that the language of the due process clause “implies and includes regular
112 Id. at 80.
113
“[I]t [was] sufficient to say that under no construction of [the due process clause] that we
have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, [could] the restraint imposed by the State of
Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a
deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision.” Id. at 80-81.
114 Id.
115 See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
116 See Corwin, supra note 61, at 375.
117 See id.
118 These cases were chosen at random by a non-legal trained colleague.
119 Merriam v. Sewall, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 316 (1857).
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allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course
of judicial proceedings.”120
Subsequently, in Jones v. Robbins,121 a habeas petition decided immedi-
ately after Merriam, the Massachusetts Supreme Court further expounded upon
this principle:
It having been stated by Lord Coke that, by the “law of the land” was intended a
due course of proceeding, according to the established rules and practice of the
courts of common law, it may perhaps be suggested, that this might include other
modes of proceeding, sanctioned by the common law, the most familiar of which are,
by informations of various kinds, by the officers of the crown in the name of the
king.  But in reply to this it may be said, that Lord Coke himself explains his own
meaning by saying, “the law of the land,” as expressed in Magna Charta, was
intended due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful
men.122
Likewise, the Michigan Supreme Court approved the position that “law of
the land” referred to an established rule or practice of a court in the cases of
Sears v. Cottrell123 [appearing first] and Parsons v. Russell124 [appearing
second]:
The words “due process of law,” mean the law of the land, and are to be so under-
stood in the constitution. . . . Lord Coke construed the words “law of the land,” to
mean due process of law. Hence, we sometimes find one phraseology used, and
sometimes the other.  They were held, and we think correctly, to mean the same thing
in The Matter of John and Cherry streets . . . . By “the law of the land” we under-
stand laws that are general in their operation, and that affect the rights of all alike;
and not a special act of the legislature, passed to affect the rights of an individual
against his will, and in a way in which the same rights of other persons are not
affected by existing laws.125
This constitutional provision is borrowed from Magna Charta—not the lan-
guage, but the idea, or principle.  The phraseology is a little different, but the one
great idea expressed is, that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except in pursuance of law.  The language of the great charter is, by the law of the
land; which Lord Coke, in commenting on the charter, paraphrased due process of
law.  The two phrases, therefore, mean the same thing.  And, history shows us, with
the clearness of a sunbeam, the meaning of the former, and that it was not intended to
protect the subjects of the king against the legislation of Parliament, but against the
illegal and arbitrary acts of the king and his government.
. . . .
. . . [Thus] the phrases, due process of law in our Constitution, and law of the
land in Magna Charta, mean the same thing.126
120 Id. at 326.
121 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
122 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
123 Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 253 (1858).
124 Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, 129 (1863).
125 Sears, 5 Mich. at 253 (citations omitted).  In this case, the principal question involved
the application of a distress-sale tax law that could be used to seize one’s property in the
event of nonpayment. Id. at 251.  On review by the Michigan Supreme Court, it was found
to be constitutional. Id. at 253.
126 Parsons, 11 Mich. at 128-29, 132.  In this case, a statute authorizing a vessel to be
seized and sold on the mere assertion of a debt or a demand for payment was held to be a
violation of due process of law. Id. at 113.
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In the middle of the Civil War, Judge Williams of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals also supported this proposition in his opinion in Norris v. Doni-
phan.127  There, the Court reviewed the propriety of a statute authorizing the
appropriation of the “property of rebels” then waging war against the Union
government.128  Although affirming that Congress could “declare [w]ar, grant
[l]etters of [m]arquee and [r]eprisal, and make [r]ules concerning [c]aptures on
[l]and and [w]ater,”129 the seizure and confiscation of property on land in this
instance was not an act of war but rather a deprivation of property without due
process of law130:
Let us pause a moment to consider what is meant in the constitution, “by due
process of law,” without which no person is to be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty.  Lord Coke gives, as the settled construction and true meaning of the words “or
by the law of the land,” in Magna Charta, “without due process of law, so that no
man be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his freehold, without due process of law; that
is, by indictment of good and lawful men.”  Judge Kent, in his twenty-fourth lecture
says:  “It may be received, as a proposition universally understood and acknowledged
throughout this country, that . . . [t]he words, by the law of the land, as used origi-
nally in Magna Charta, in reference to this subject, are understood to mean due
process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men.  The
better and larger definition of due process of law is, that it means law in its regular
course of administration through courts of justice[”]. . . . Judge Story . . . says . . .
[“]Lord Coke says these latter words, by the law of the land, mean by due process of
law; that is, without due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to answer
thereto by due process of the common law.  So that this clause, in effect, affirms the
right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the common law.”131
Similarly, in 1869, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided Weaver v.
Lapsley.132  There, it held that:
[t]he terms “the law of the land,” “due process of law,” and “due course of law,”
whether found in the English charters and statutes, or in our American constitutions,
have the same meaning.  Lord Coke says that “by the law of the land,” means “by
due course and process of law, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men,
where such deeds be done, in due manner, or by writ original of the common law.”
In Dorman v. The State, 34 Ala., at page 236, the court says “due process of law”
means a judicial proceeding, regularly conducted in a court of justice, as contra-
distinguished from a statutory enactment.133
Juxtaposing these decisions demonstrates that America’s early legal commenta-
tors considered “due process of law” to be synonymous with “the law of the
land,” regardless of how grammatically incongruent the substitution may ini-
tially appear.  Furthermore, the cases show that each phrase was used in refer-
ence to a regularly conducted judicial proceeding.
In another case decided in 1869, the Supreme Court of Tennessee also
signaled its interpretation that due process of law referred to the “rules and
127 Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 424-25 (1863).
128 Id. at 387.
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
130 Norris, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) at 400.
131 Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added).
132 Weaver v. Lapsely, 43 Ala. 224 (1869).
133 Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
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forms” used in adjudication.134  Moreover, the court held that the courts could
not declare an act void merely because, in its opinion, the act was opposed to
the spirit that was supposed to pervade the constitution:
The phrase, “the law of the land” is another expression for the “due process of law;”
and is of equivalent import, in respect to the question involved in the present
litigation.
The “due process of law,” or the “law of the land,” by which a person may be
deprived or divested of his properties . . . is not an act of the Legislature, or any act of
executive power, or a proceeding in a court other than a proceeding wherein the party
whose wright [sic] is involved, can have, or is authorized to have, a hearing and to
make defense.  A definition given by Mr. Daniel Webster of “due process of law,”
has been much commended. The law of the land or due process of law, he says:  “Is
the general law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial.  The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property and immunities, under general rules which govern society:”  4
Wheaton, 519.  Mr. Justice Edwards, (12 New York Reports, 209,) defines the rule
thus:  “Due process of law, undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceed-
ings, according to those rules and forms which have been established for the protec-
tion of private rights.”135
Similarly, in a case involving a municipal dog regulation, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court also concluded that the legislature intended the language
of its constitution to require that “proceedings” be construed according to the
“law for the time being”136:
In this State it would seem to have been understood that the provision of the Bill
of Rights which prohibits all acts affecting life, liberty or property, except “by the
law of the land,” was not intended to limit the legislative power, but only to require
that the proceedings should be according to the law for the time being.  But the same
limitation on the legislature has been by our courts placed on the ground that the
general grant of authority to make reasonable and wholesome laws confers no power
to enact a law in violation of the fundamental maxims of justice and equity; and the
interpretation given to the term “law of the land” in the constitutions of other States,
when applied as a limitation upon legislative authority, amounts in substance to the
same thing; for as interpreted there, the term “law of the land” is understood to
embody in legal meaning the fundamental rules and maxims of justice which pre-
vailed in the law of the time when the constitutions were adopted.137
In the 1860 decision of Griffin v. Mixon,138 the Mississippi High Court of
Errors and Appeals ruled on a statute providing for the forfeiture of land to the
State upon the owner’s failure to pay the appropriate amount of property
taxes.139  In its opinion, the court discussed whether “due process of law,” “due
134 State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233, 245 (1869).
135 Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added).
136 E. Kingston v. Towle, 48 N.H. 57, 58, 61 (1868).
137 Id. at 61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  In one of the more unusual due process
decisions rendered by a court, this case involved the propriety of “an act in relation to dam-
ages occasioned by dogs” which was found to be unconstitutional because the ability to
unilaterally charge the dog’s owner for the amount of damage caused by the dog without an
opportunity to be heard violated the right to a jury trial which normally occurred in situations
involving a deprivation of property. Id. at 57.
138 Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424 (1860).
139 Id. at 424.
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course of law,” and “the law of the land” were meant to share a particular
meaning and, if so, what that meaning was understood to be:
When the Constitution declares that the citizen shall not be deprived “of his life,
liberty, or property, but by due course of law,” it means what Magna Charta meant by
“the law of the land,” [and] what the Constitution of the United States means by “due
process of law.” . . . Lord Coke says, “that to judge a man in a civil or criminal case,
without affording him an opportunity of being heard, would be against this provision
in Magna Charta.”
Mr. Webster says:  “By the law of the land is most clearly intended, the general
law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and ren-
ders judgment only after trial.  The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of general rules which govern
society. . . .
. . . “The meaning of this section, then, seems to be, that no member of the State
shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of his rights or privileges, unless the matter
shall be adjudged against him, upon trial, had according to the course of the common
law. . . . It cannot be done by mere legislation.”
. . . .
Judge Story says:  “This clause in effect affirms the right of trial according to
the process and proceedings of the common law.” . . .
. . . .
“By ‘the law of the land’ is meant the law of an individual case, as established
in a fair open trial, or an opportunity given for such trial in open court, and by due
process of law.  Not a bill of attainder, in the shape of an act of Assembly, whereby a
man’s property is swept away from him without a hearing, trial, or judgment, or the
opportunity of making known his rights or producing his evidence.”
. . . [T]he words per legem terre mean, by due process of law, and being brought
into court to answer according to law. . . .
. . . .
. . . “Law of the land means due course and process of law,” . . . . “by indictment
or presentment,” . . . “or by original writ of the common law.”140
Finally, in 1870 the State of Pennsylvania opined on the validity of an
owner’s title to logs floated in the Susquehanna River in Craig & Blanchard v.
Kline.141  Under the terms of this decision, the Court viewed due process of
law as a requirement that all claims for justice be tried in court:
The law of the land means by due process of law . . . .  It does not mean merely an act
of the legislature, for that would abrogate all restriction on legislative power:  2 Kent
13* in note.  The design of the Convention (says Gibson, C. J.) was to exclude arbi-
trary power from every branch of the government; and there would be no exclusion
of it, if such rescripts or decrees were allowed to take effect in the form of a statute:
Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 173.  This provision and those as to the administration of
justice in the bill of rights, require that all claims for justice between man and man,
shall be tried, decided and enforced by the judicial authority of the state and by due
course of law . . . .142
140 Id. at 442-45 (citations omitted).
141 Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 400 (1870).
142 Id. at 413.
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EXPOSING THE CONTRADICTION
As John Hart Ely once famously remarked, “[T]here is simply no avoiding
the fact that the word that follows ‘due’ is ‘process.’ . . . Familiarity breeds
inattention, and we apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive due
process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness.’”143
After reviewing the case law and historical documents in which the due process
clause or its primitive versions appear, one may very well conclude that Ely’s
statement is correct and that substantive due process is indeed a contradiction
of terms.
Reviewing the support for this premise in sequential order, there is first
the language of Tabula Nona.  Appearing 450 years before the founding of the
Roman Empire, this early safeguard—crude though it might be—clearly
reflects a heightened concern with the procedure through which a particular
deprivation would occur instead of the substantive merit of its occurrence.144
The phrase “[o]nly the great comitium has the right of legislating so as to inflict
a punishment on a citizen involving his life, his liberty, or his civic rights”
excludes any reference to the substantive propriety of these punishments.145
Instead, the phrase merely identifies which institution determines whether the
deprivation would occur and, through the legislative element, the procedure
used to affect it.146
Thirteen-hundred years later, Alfred the Great’s introduction of the jury
system into Saxon criminal law further refined the procedure for depriving
someone of fundamental rights such as life or liberty.147  Instead of allowing an
assembly like the Roman Comitia to determine whether the deprivation should
occur, Alfred “instituted trials by jury; by which, in all criminal cases it was
ordained, that twelve men should decide whether the accused person was guilty
of the offence laid to his charge or not.”148  As with the Comitia Centuriata,
this legal development does not appear to be concerned with the substantive
dimension of the punishment (i.e. whether it was morally right or wrong) but
simply with who determined whether it should be inflicted.149
Going forward another three-hundred years, neither the language of the
Magna Charta nor its surrounding historical context indicates the presence of
any substantive emphasis or concern.150  Although the passage states that “[n]o
freeman shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor disseized, nor out-lawed, nor
exiled, nor destroyed in any manner; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn
him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land,”151 it
does not discuss any of the substantive value of these particular types of depri-
143 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18
(1980).
144 See supra text accompanying note 20.
145 THE TWELVE TABLES, supra note 16, at 588.
146 Id.
147 See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at iii-iv.
148 Id. at iii (emphasis removed).
149 Id. at iv.
150 See supra notes 30-61 and accompanying text.
151 MAGNA CHARTA cl. 39, reprinted in SOUTHEY, supra note 35, at 207 & JOHNSON, supra
note 27, at 207.
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vation.  Rather, it refers only to the procedural mechanism through which the
deprivation was to occur:  “by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land.”152  With the enactment of the Liberty of Subject Act a century later,
Edward III further modified the phrasing of this clause by substituting “due
process of law” for “the law of the land;” yet, as context suggests and future
cases would conclude, the underlying principle was meant to be interpreted
synonymously.153
Even if this historical analysis is completely erroneous, the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. ultimately
reached the same understanding.  By establishing that “[t]he words, ‘due pro-
cess of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the
words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in [the] Magna Charta,”154  Justice Curtis
implicitly recognized that “due process of law” was meant to be viewed as a
unified concept; if one group of four words was “undoubtedly intended” to
have the same meaning as a different group of six words, it logically follows
that the emphasis is not on the individual words in the two groups but rather on
the collective meaning these words achieve acting together.155  In this sense,
the whole is indeed greater than the sum of its individual parts.
Establishing due process of law as a unified phrase is a critical step toward
resolving the question of whether substantive due process is a contradiction of
terms.  If the phrase is seen as having a common meaning with “the law of the
land,” it is much more conceivable that due process of law had “a generally
accepted meaning that differed from what someone ignorant of that meaning
would deduce from the words themselves.”156  Admittedly, it is difficult for the
twenty-first century scholar to discern with exact precision what the Framers
understood the phrase to mean.  However, by examining the historical context
and legal environment in which they were educated, it is possible to ascertain
what the eighteenth century legal mind commonly understood “the law of the
land” (and by association “due process of law”) to mean.  If educated members
of society generally understood the terms to have a particular meaning, then the
Founders might simply have not seen a need to spell it out in the Constitution,
believing, however erroneously, that because they understood what it meant,
others would intuitively grasp the principle as well.
Historical sources and legal publications from the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries show that “the law of the land” is itself a stand-in for another
phrase, namely, the common law.157  In the reign of Queen Anne, the law of
the land (and by association the common law) was regarded as a “Rule of
Judicature.”158  However, American state courts provide the clearest indication
that this phrase referred to the common law of judicial rules and procedures.
152 Id.
153 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855); Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113, 129, 132 (1863); Merriam v. Sewall, 74 Mass. (8
Gray) 316, 326 (1857).
154 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
156 Harrison, supra note 6, at 553.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
158 See BOYER, supra note 80, at 296.
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As noted in Jones v. Robbins, “by the ‘law of the land’ was intended a due
course of proceeding, according to the established rules and practice of the
courts of common law.”159  Similarly, in Weaver v. Lapsley, the Alabama
Supreme Court held that “‘due process of law’ means a judicial proceeding,
regularly conducted in a court of justice, as contra-distinguished from a statu-
tory enactment.”160
Without repeating the full panoply of decisions discussed previously, it is
sufficient to say the evidence shows that state courts interpreted the due process
clause as a procedural, rather than substantive, device.  Furthermore, the histor-
ical evolution of the clause—as seen through Tabula Nona, the Magna Charta,
the Liberty of Subject Act, and the American Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments—strongly supports the conclusion that “substantive” due process was
simply not on the constitutional radar.161  Indisputably, twenty-first century
America is different from thirteenth-century England or post-monarchial Rome,
but in each of these environments, the purpose of the due process clause
appears fundamentally procedural without regard for the deprivation’s substan-
tive effect.162
159 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 346 (1857) (emphasis added).
160 Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224, 232 (1869).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 119-33.
162 Although exceeding the scope and focus of this Article, it is arguable that much of the
“substantive” analysis currently conducted under the due process clause could be safely real-
located to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities clause instead.  While the
logistical challenges and practical feasibility of resurrecting this line of constitutional analy-
sis in the wake of Slaughterhouse would provide innumerable sources of scholarly debate
and academic conversation, such a discussion goes beyond this paper’s narrow focus of
whether substantive due process, in view of the textual evolution of the due process clause,
is a contradiction of terms.
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APPENDIX
CORONATION CHARTER OF HENRY I, A.D. 1101163
In the year of the incarnation of the Lord, 1101, Henry, son of King Wil-
liam, after the death of his brother William, by the grace of God, king of the
English, to all faithful, greeting:
1.  Know that by the mercy of God, and by the common counsel of the
barons of the whole kingdom of England, I have been crowned king of the
same kingdom; and because the kingdom has been oppressed by unjust exac-
tions, I, from regard to God, and from the love which I have toward you, in the
first place make the holy church of God free, so that I will neither sell nor place
at rent, nor, when archbishop, or bishop, or abbot is dead, will I take anything
from the domain of the church, or from its men, until a successor is installed
into it.  And all the evil customs by which the realm of England was unjustly
oppressed will I take away, which evil customs I partly set down here.
2.  If any one of my barons, or earls, or others who hold from me shall
have died, his heir shall not redeem his land, as he did in the time of my
brother, but shall relieve it by a just and legitimate relief.  Similarly also the
men of my barons shall relieve their lands from their lords by a just and legiti-
mate relief.
3.  And if any one of the barons or other men of mine wishes to give his
daughter in marriage, or his sister or niece in relation, he must speak with me
about it, but I will neither take anything from him for this permission, nor
forbid him to give her in marriage, unless he should wish to join her to my
enemy.  And if when a baron or other man of mine is dead a daughter remains
as his heir, I will give her in marriage according to the judgment of my barons,
along with her land.  And if when a man is dead his wife remains and is without
children, she shall have her dowry and right of marriage, and I will not give her
to a husband except according to her will.
4.  And if a wife has survived with children, she shall have her dowry
and right of marriage, so long as she shall have kept her body legitimately, and
I will not give her in marriage, except according to her will.  And the guardian
of the land and children shall be either the wife or another one of the relatives
as shall seem to be most just.  And I require that my barons should deal simi-
larly with the sons and daughters or wives of their men.
5.  The common tax on money which used to be taken through the cities
and counties, which was not taken in the time of King Edward, I now forbid
altogether henceforth be taken.  If any one shall have been seized, whether a
moneyer or any other, with false money, strict justice shall be done for it.
6.  All fines and all debts which were owed to my brother, I remit, except
my rightful rents, and except those payments which had been agreed upon for
the inheritances of others or for those things which more justly affected others.
And if any one for his own inheritance has stipulated anything, this I remit, and
all reliefs which had been agreed upon for rightful inheritances.
163 Coronation Charter of Henry I, A.D. 1101, reprinted in English Constitutional
Documents of the Middle Ages, in 1 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL
SOURCES OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 6-3 to -5 (Edward P. Cheyney ed., 1902).
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7.  And if any one of my barons or men shall become feeble, however he
himself shall give or arrange to give his money, I grant that it shall be so given.
Moreover, if he himself, prevented by arms, or by weakness, shall not have
bestowed his money, or arranged to bestow it, his wife or his children or his
parents, and his legitimate men shall divide it for his soul, as to them shall seem
best.
8.  If any of my barons or men shall have committed an offence he shall
not give security to the extent of forfeiture of his money, as he did in the time
of my father, or of my brother, but according to the measure of the offence so
shall he pay, as he would have paid from the time of my father backward, in the
time of my other predecessors; so that if he shall have been convicted of treach-
ery or of crime, he shall pay as is just.
9.  All murders, moreover, before that day in which I was crowned king,
I pardon; and those which shall be done henceforth shall be punished justly
according to the law of King Edward.
10.  The forests, by the common agreement of my barons, I have retained
in my own hand, as my father held them.
11.  To those knights to hold their land by the cuirass, I yield of my own
gift the lands of their demesne ploughs free from all payments and from all
labor, so that as they have thus been favored by such a great alleviation, so they
may readily provide themselves with horses and arms for my service and for
the defence of the kingdom.
12.  A firm peace in my whole kingdom I establish and require to be kept
from henceforth.
13.  The law of Kind Edward I give to you again with those changes with
which my father changed it by the counsel of his barons.164
14.  If any one has taken anything from my possessions since the death of
King William, my brother, or from the possessions of any one, let the whole be
immediately returned without alteration, and if any one shall have retained any-
thing thence, he upon whom it is found will pay it heavily to me.  Witnesses
Maurice, bishop of London, and Gundulf, bishop, and William, bishop-elect,
and Henry, earl, and Simon, earl, and Walter Giffard, and Robert de Montfort,
and Roger Bigod, and Henry de Port, at London, when I was crowned.
164 With respect to the “law of King Edward” referenced in paragraph 13, as noted by
Charles Warren Hollister:
This was doubtless the fundamental principle underlying the coronation charter, just as the idea
of continuity with the Anglo-Saxon royal line and the Anglo-Saxon past was a major theme of
Henry’s reign.  There was of course, literally speaking, no “law of King Edward.”  Unlike a
number of his Old English predecessors, Edward the Confessor issued no dooms.  But as is made
clear in legal treatises written during Henry I’s reign—the Quadripartitus and the Leges Henrici
Primi—the “law of King Edward” was taken to summarize the entire Anglo-Saxon past; it con-
stituted the totality of earlier Anglo-Saxon law that remained in effect during Edward’s reign.
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